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 Chapter One 
1 Introduction 
1.1  Background of the Study 
 
The concept of transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that states may use to 
address past human rights wrongs. In the aftermath of civil conflict or repressive rule marked 
by widespread human rights violations, transitional societies should address the past for stable 
and peaceful future. In this context, Ethiopia has attempted to deal with its past human rights 
wrongs since 1991.The soldiers who mounted a successful coup against Emperor Haile 
selassie in 1974 constituted themselves as a revolutionary, 120-parliament, (Derg) which 
eventually established a socialist oriented regime.1 This military rule ruthlessly took the lives 
of thousands of Ethiopians in the name of Red Terror. Extra-judicial killings, disappearances 
and mass killings were common in the system. After 17 bitter years of administration, the 
communist military rule was toppled in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (hereinafter EPRDF).   
 
Upon the coming to power of EPRDF, it was expected to respond towards the legacy of 
human rights abuses so as to heal the victims from their wounds and to prevent future human 
rights violations. Accordingly, the EPRDF established the Office of the Special Prosecutor 
mandated to bring those criminally responsible for human rights violations and/or corruption 
to justice.2 According to Proclamation No.22/92 (the enabling legislation of the Office of the 
Special Prosecutor), Ethiopia has focused on judicial approach to address the past human 
rights abuses. After its establishment, the Office of the Special Prosecutor began to 
investigate human rights violations and instituted charges against members of the defunct 
regime before the Federal High Court and Regional Supreme Courts through delegation.  
 
In addition to addressing the past state-sponsored human rights infringements, Ethiopia post 
1991 has ratified various human rights instruments, incorporated human rights norms in its 
legal system, established human rights institutions and revising its laws in conformity with 
                                                 
1 Paul H. Brietzke, Ethiopia’s “Leap in the Dark”: Federalism and Self-determination in the New Constitution, 
Journal of African law, Vol.39 No.1, (1995), p.19. 
2 Proclamation No. 22/1992, a Proclamation for the Establishment of the Special Prosecutors Office, Negarit 
Gazeta, (1992), article 6. 
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human rights norms so as to create a human rights culture in the country. Regardless of these 
attempts, many human rights activists declared that the recurrence of state repression has, in 
particular following 2005 election, been discerned contrary to the society’s hope and 
government’s promise when it took power it would give human rights and peace to thrive. 
Furthermore, the prosecution of the former Derg officials has taken more than a decade which 
in effect undermines the rights of the defendants. Thus, the attempts to create a culture of 
human rights have faced several challenges. 
 
In this thesis, the attempts to create human rights culture and some of their counter challenges 
will be touched upon. The thesis has been divided in to five chapters. The first chapter 
presents an overview of the background of the study, the significance of the study, the 
research questions, and the methodology employed.  In the second chapter, it is sought to 
discuss the concept of transitional justice and the different models that a transitional society 
may use in the course of transformation. In chapter three, the Ethiopian Red Terror Trials as 
response to the past gross human rights abuses will be discussed. The trials will also be 
assessed in light of international human rights standards and domestic legislations. Chapter 
four will be devoted to examine the attempts (other than addressing the past) made to create a 
culture of human rights. The challenges of human rights in the country will also be discussed. 
Finally, the conclusion will be the fifth chapter. 
 
1.2 The objective and significance of the study 
 
Before embarking upon the objective of the study, it is important at this juncture to explain 
the reasons why this writer is motivated to work on this title. First, the immediate cause is 
attributable to the timing of the end of the trial of the 73 top Derg officials after 12 years of 
criminal proceedings. The Federal High Court of Ethiopia pronounced its judgment on the 
accused for past human rights wrongs in January 2007. Second, irrespective of its limited 
human and financial resources, the commitment of Ethiopia to bring the gross human rights 
violators of the defunct regime before the national court is also striking. Perhaps, Ethiopia is 
the first African country which brought the entire regime before the national court for the 
serious crimes committed while in power. In this regard, it is said that “the Red Terror Trials 
of Ethiopia are considered as Africa’s glaring example of retributive justice; just as the Truth 
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and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was Africa’s contribution to restorative justice.”3 
Third, the country has taken two important measures to create a human rights culture: 
addressing the legacy of its past through judicial means and adopting human rights norms 
through ratification of human rights instruments and incorporation of them in the domestic 
law. Nonetheless, regardless of these two crucial measures, the human rights record of the 
country is, as we shall see in chapter four, appalling. Human rights guarantees are far from 
being implemented as provided by the law. 
 
The thesis is designed with the following two important objectives. The first objective is to 
examine the process of dealing with the past gross human rights violations in Ethiopia, and to 
assess its significance particularly in ensuring rule of law and human rights in the country. By 
so doing, it is hoped that the study will present the picture of transitional justice in Ethiopia, 
which in turn will at least serve as starting point for further research. 
 
The second objective is to discuss the country’s attempts (other than addressing the past) for 
effective transition and full realization of human rights. To this end, the ongoing situation of 
the country in regard to human rights will be touched upon, and some of the challenges will 
thereby be highlighted. By doing so, the study is hoped to contribute in identifying the serious 
challenges of human rights in the country. 
 
1.3 Statement of problem 
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, transitional societies have different options to choose in 
order to address the issue of past serious human rights violations. For better or worse the 
current government of Ethiopia, soon after seizing power, decided to address the issue of past 
state-sponsored human rights abuses by judicial means. In this spirit, in 1992 the government 
established the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) with the objectives of creating historical 
record of the past abuses and bringing those criminally responsible for human rights 
violations and/or corruption to justice. The SPO brought the first charge against the 73 Derg 
                                                 
3 Kjetil Tronvoll et al, The Red Terror Trials: the Context of Transitional Justice in Ethiopia, in Kjetil et al. 
(eds.), The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged, Oxford, James Currey Publishers, 
forthcoming book, p.13. 
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top officials in 1994, and three years later it filed charges against 5198 members of the former 
regime for killing of 8752 persons, causing the disappearance of 2611 people, and torturing 
1837 others.4 Since then the criminal proceedings have been underway. The Federal High 
Court and Regional Supreme Courts have pronounced judgments on the trials in their 
respective jurisdiction though there are still pending cases before them.  For instance, the 
proceeding against the 73 Derg top officials (including the former president), one of the 
prominent case in Red Terror Trials, was finally decided on January 11, 2007 after 12 years 
trial. Some of the accused in the case were detained for about three years without charge 
before the proceedings. 
 
 The whole process of prosecution appears to disregard the rights of the accused: the right to 
be brought promptly before court, the right to be represented by legal counsel and the right to 
speed trial.5 On top of this, according to various human rights activists, there has been the 
recurrence of human rights abuses while the prosecution of the past wrongdoers has been 
underway and the country has adopted human rights norms. This being the case, the study is 
generally intended to examine whether or not the Red Terror Trials and the adoption of 
human rights norms have created a human rights culture in the country. In particular, the 
following issues will be addressed: whether or not the Red Terror Trials have led to the 
desired outcome, for instance, in providing a lesson to the public, preventing atrocities in the 
future and thereby creating a stable future? To what extent the criminal proceedings have 
been conducted in accordance with the domestic law and international law undertaken by 
Ethiopia? Do addressing the past, ratifying human rights instruments and incorporating them 
in the domestic law suffice for human rights enforcement? Why human rights violations are 
there while addressing the past wrongs and creating a human rights friendly situation in the 
country? 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Trial Observation and Information Project, Ethiopia’s Red Terror Trials: Africa’s First War Tribunal, 
Consolidated Summery and Reports from Trail Observations made from 1996-1999, Compiled by NIHR’s 
Project, p.1. 
5 Julie Mayfield, The Prosecution of War Criminals and Respect for Human Rights: Ethiopia’s Balance Act, 
Emory International Law Review, Vol. 9, (1995),  pp. 575-591. 
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1.4  Methodology  
 
It is mainly intended to carry out this study from a legal and a political science perspectives. 
Both primary and secondary resources will be consulted in the study. Domestic legislation, 
international treaties and cases will be used as primary source materials. Besides, books, 
journals, articles and others will be employed as secondary source materials. In the course of 
the study, the writer is of the opinion to cite the situation of another country in comparison to 
Ethiopia if need be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 7
Chapter Two 
2 An Overview of Transitional Justice 
2.1 The Notion of Transitional Justice 
  
Discussion about transitional justice and about ways of dealing with past repressive regimes 
has recently become the concern of human rights activists. This is partly because so many 
countries have in recent years become transitional societies and partly because such societies 
offer unusual opportunities to capture and punish perpetrators.6 The notion of transitional 
justice has captured much attention and begun to be considered as subfield of human rights 
that addresses past human rights violations by using judicial and/or non-judicial mechanisms. 
According to Charles T. Call, transitional justice holds broader significance for having given 
birth to “an array of innovative and evolving instruments to expose and punish human rights 
abusers,” and having had “an unexpected influence on state sovereignty and on hopes for 
global justice.”7 In the past, bringing a head of state or leaders of a country to justice was 
inconceivable. However, there have recently been an unprecedented number of indicted 
political leaders in the dock, or, the shadow of its threat: Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam 
Hussein, Augusto Pinochet, Charles Taylor, and Alberto Fujimori.8 
 
Although the origin of transitional justice can be traced back to World War I, it becomes 
understood as both extraordinary and international in the post war period after 1945.9 In the 
aftermath of World War II, the establishment of International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo as a reaction to the holocaust was one of the innovation of the 
international community. The prosecution of German and Japanese soldiers and their leaders 
for the crimes committed during the war has been remarkable from historical perspective, 
even though critics charged the tribunals with selective and politicized prosecutions and 
retroactive punishment.10 
 
                                                 
6 Charles Call, Is Transitional Justice Really Just?, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, issue 1, Watson 
Institute for International Studies, (2004), p.101. 
7 Ibid 
8  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice: Post War Legacies, Cardozo Law Review, Vol.27:4, (2006), P.1. 
9  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.16, (2003), p.1. 
10 Martha Minow, Innovating Responses to the Past: Human Rights Institutions, in Nigel Biggar(ed.), Burying 
the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 
(2003), p.88. 
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The term transitional justice does not have a single definition. Some define it narrowly and 
others broadly. To understand the terminology well, we are going to see few of its definitions. 
According to Teitel, transitional justice can be defined as “conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrong doing 
of repressive predecessor regimes.”11 This definition is criticized for ignoring war-torn 
societies and overvaluing legal responses. As the wording of the definition suggests it is 
confined to legal mechanism like prosecution without taking in to account other mechanism 
like truth commission. Besides, it presupposes repressive regime, which may not always be 
required for transitional justice. It disregards political transition from civil conflict in case of 
anarchism to peace. 
 
 In its broadest sense, “transitional justice refers to how societies ‘transitioning’ from 
repressive rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities, how they overcome social divisions 
or seek reconciliation, and how they create justice system so as to prevent future human rights 
violations.”12 This definition appears to solve the shortcoming of the foregoing definition. 
 
Furthermore, the United Nations Secretary General, in his 2004 report on transitional justice 
and rule of law, has given a comprehensive definition for transitional justice by defining it as: 
 
The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or 
none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.13 
 
As per this definition, transitional justice refers to a range of mechanisms or processes that 
transitional societies may use to address past human rights wrongs caused by conflict, 
repressive rule or state failure and includes both judicial and non-judicial approaches like 
trials, truth commissions, memorials and institutional reform initiatives. Transitional societies 
have attempted various approaches to serve justice and to attain either individual or collective 
accountability for the past human rights violations. These approaches are seen to clarify the 
                                                 
11 Ruti Teitel, supra note 9, p.1. 
12 Charles Call, supra note 6, p.101. 
13 The UN Secretary General Report, the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict 
Societies, (2004), S/2004/616, para. 8. 
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human rights records, identify victims and perpetrators, to provide reparations to the former 
and prosecute the latter.  
 
2.2  Models of Transitional Justice 
 
As the name suggests transition involves a passage or journey from one stage to another. This 
of course begs the question of transition from what to what and how. The transformation can 
be either from repressive rule to the democratic order or from armed conflict to peace. In 
some cases these two may overlap. The divergence of opinion comes to exist in relation to the 
question of how to transit or how to deal with the past during transition. In this regard, 
scholars do not agree on how to deal with the past human rights atrocities even if they appear 
to hold similar opinion in addressing the legacies of human rights violations. Particularly 
there is strong debate among scholars on the most effective ways of achieving justice, peace 
and reconciliation, suggesting a dichotomy between judicial approaches (what some authors 
call retributive justice) and non-judicial approaches (what some authors call reconciliatory 
justice or restorative justice).14 Some others advocate the combination of the two mechanisms 
by reconstructing the truth, reconciling the parties and prosecuting those responsible for 
committing massive breaches of human rights. Various transitional societies have attempted 
one or both of these approaches to discover the truth about the past human rights wrongs, to 
attain some form of accountability, and thereby to create stable future.  
 
As noted above, the debate revolves around the question of either to prosecute or forgive or 
combine the two during transition. It has recently been understood as a dilemma between 
justice and peace. To put it differently, the key issue that emerged in transitional justice has 
been the question of making peace or doing justice: Should we punish massive human rights 
violations committed under old regimes or give amnesty for the sake of peace and 
reconciliation? Should transitional regimes buy peace at the price of justice or vice-versa? Are 
peace and justice mutually exclusive? The tension between peace and justice is the extension 
of the debate on the mechanisms of transitional justice. Arguments forwarded by proponents 
of each models transitional justice are as follow.  
 
                                                 
14 Yolanda Gamarra Chopo, Peace with Justice: the Role of Prosecution in Peace Making and Reconciliation, a 
paper, (2007), p.2. 
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 2.2.1 Prosecution  
 
Transition to democratic order is usually linked with prosecution and punishment of the old 
regimes. The use of judicial prosecutions is ranging from entirely domestic prosecution by 
national courts to international intervention through hybrid courts, ad hoc tribunals and 
permanent court. Many advocate that prosecution and punishment is the best response to 
human rights abuses. For them, failure to prosecute such crimes amounts to a tacit 
endorsement. Besides, it is usually perceived that non-prosecution of gross human rights 
violations of prior regimes constitutes a subjugation of justice to political compromise.15 
Prosecution, they argue, promotes stability, the rule of law, democracy, and deterrence of the 
commission of atrocities; ensures accountability; and appropriately punishes atrocity 
perpetrators.16 And hence failure to prosecute and punish offenders of human rights abuses in 
times of transition is detrimental to the rule of law and reconciliation at the interpersonal level 
and to the society at large in its quest for future accountable democratic order. Besides, as one 
can understand, for instance, from article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, article 7 of the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or punishment, and the four Geneva Conventions, 
states are duty bound to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities. Hence, states 
should include criminal investigation and prosecution as a means to provide justice for the 
victims and their survivors.  
 
According to this line of argument, prosecution helps legitimate the new government and 
demonstrates its commitment to address the past and to respect human rights. If the new 
democratic regime does not establish a precedent for punishing gross violations of human 
rights, then at some future date the new regime may resort to authoritarianism, or that the 
democratic order may be toppled by those who believe that there is no cost to human rights 
violations.17 
 
                                                 
15 Kobina Daniel, Amnesty as a Tool of Transitional Justice: the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Profile, Dissertation, Law Faculty of Pretoria University, South Africa, (2001) p.1. 
16 Zachary Kaufman, The Future of Transitional Justice, Stair 1, No.1, (2005), p.66. 
17  Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East 
Germany and  South Africa, Columbia Journal Transnational Law, (2001), p.100 
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 Prosecution is very important for the determination of individual responsibility and not 
assigning that responsibility to the entire group so that the latter not be blamed for the 
atrocities committed by just certain members.18 This, in effect, avoids the trap of collective 
guilt which inevitably falls along ethnic lines or a group and forestalls collective revenge. 
This option focuses on pursuing justice through individual responsibility which has an 
important role in preventing the recurrence of human rights violations. By prosecuting 
individual perpetrators and holding them criminally responsible for their actions, the aim is to 
deter them and others from committing such crimes again in the future.19 Moreover, it is 
important to create historical record of events and atrocities. In sum, the advocates of this 
option have the following to say: 
 
Seeking justice through the institutions of the law is the best means of determining 
responsibility for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other politically motivated 
violations of human rights. Criminal prosecutions of crimes of this magnitude not only 
punish the individual who committed them, demonstrating that impunity does not exist, 
but also help to restore dignity to their victims. They can provide a cathartic experience 
not only for individual victims, but also for the society as a whole. By holding 
individuals responsible for their misdeeds, criminal trials may also deter the 
commission of abuses in the future. Moreover if conducted in strict accordance with 
legal due process, prosecutions of war crimes can help to strengthen the rule of law and 
establish the truth about the past through accepted legal means.20 
 
2.2.2 Amnesty and Reconciliation 
 
The second option is amnesty and reconciliation a mechanism whereby an authority grants a 
pardon for the past offenses.21 This approach may entail the establishment of a truth 
commission aiming to uncover the truth about the past atrocities, rather than to punish the 
perpetrators. There are two amnesty options: conditional and unconditional amnesties. 
Conditional amnesty is granted in exchange for truthful testimony, including the option of 
prosecution if that testimony were judged incomplete or untruthful.22 The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa can be cited as an example of this kind. For 
                                                 
18 Mieter Magsam, Coming to the Terms with Genocide in Rwanda: the Role of International and National 
Justice, in Walfgang Kaleck et.al.(eds.), International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, German, Berlin 
Heidelberg press, (2007), p.164. 
19 Yolanda Gamarra Chopo, supra note 14, p.24. 
20 Donald  Hafner and Elizabeth King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional Justice: How Trials, Truth 
Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability can and should Work Together, Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review, Vol.30:91, (2007), p.93. 
21 Zachary Kaufman, supra note 16, p.63. 
22 Ibid 
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granting of amnesty for the wrongs of apartheid, political motivation for the crime and full 
disclosure of the facts in a public hearing under cross-examination were required.23 Those 
who failed to meet these two conditions were exposed to prosecution. Whereas unconditional 
amnesty (which usually does not entail truth commission) grants a general amnesty to alleged 
atrocity perpetrators not based on the breadth or accuracy of testimony or any other 
condition.24 Amnesty and reconciliation focuses on the healing and renewal of community 
relationships. 
 
 Advocates argue that overcoming past crimes and injuries will necessitate forward-looking 
strategies associated with truth telling, forgiveness, reconciliation and rehabilitation. They 
criticize the proponents of prosecution for assuming that prosecution will be possible in the 
wake of human rights disasters. Besides, prosecution may prove to be expensive and slow, 
and may also perpetuate a cycle of vengeance. Not only is an amnesty for human rights 
abuses often a precondition for securing a smooth political transition, they argue, but many 
fledgling democracies have simply not had the power, popular support, legal tools, or 
conditions necessary to prosecute effectively.25 They contend that prosecution has only 
worked in cases where the military has lost power. Where the old regime’s military is 
powerful, attempts to prosecute its members may spark rebellion. In support of this some 
argue that the South African reasonably peaceful transition from repression to democracy 
would instead have become a bloodbath if prosecution had been used without some amnesty 
provisions.26 It is mainly because the transitional South African government relies on the 
military and police of the former white minority regime, and their demands for amnesty had 
to be met before any change in the government could take place. In such cases, a policy of 
amnesty and reconciliation is the best way to protect the new democracy. Fragile democracies 
may be undermined by politically charged trials by increasing rather than decreasing the 
possibility of renewed conflict.27 They also put their fear saying that after transition such 
trials may be politically motivated against opponents of the new regime (so called victor’s 
justice).  
 sum, truth and reconciliation commissions are very important to: 
                                                
 
In
 
23 Yolanda Gamarra Chopo, supra note 14, p.10. 
24 Zachary Kuafman , supra note 16, p. 63. 
25 Miriam  Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 15, (2002), p.1. 
26 Maryam Kamali, supra note 17, p.121. 
27 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights, New York, Oxford University Press, (2000), p.271. 
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 r nder superfluous long trials against thousands of the alleged 
perpetrators.28 
rt (ICC) 
ould lead to a decline in the attractiveness of amnesty as an alternative mechanism.  
 
2.2.3 A combined model 
                                     
(i) further understanding in lieu of vengeance, reparation in lieu of retaliation, and 
reconciliation instead of victimization; (ii) promote a kind of historical catharsis 
through public exposure of crimes; (iii) delve into historical, social, and political roots 
of the crimes; (iv) establish a historical record of the atrocities committed; and (v) 
prevent or e
 
On the other hand, opponents argue that the flaws of these commissions should not be 
underestimated; they have proved unable to bring about real and lasting reconciliation in 
many cases.29 In addition, amnesty undermines the international legal regime on the 
protection and promotion of human rights and rule of law. Such process tends to send the 
wrong signal that impunity is an accepted culture; thereby setting the stage for future abuses 
by political leaders. Owing to this, the viability of amnesty as alternative to a predominantly 
prosecution-based transitional policy has become more doubtful in light of recent 
developments in international law.30 Specifically, third-country prosecution (universal 
jurisdiction on core crimes) and prosecution before the International Criminal Cou
c
 
As it can be understood from the above arguments, the two approaches of transitional justice 
are deemed to be fundamentally at odds with each other without having anything in common. 
And it is traditionally believed that a society must choose one or the other.31 This view has, 
however, been challenged by a third alternative approach arguing that transitional societies 
must strive to realize both retribution and restoration, and balance them in appropriate way. 
This approach is to combine retribution and reconciliation, with selective prosecutions those 
who committed egregious crimes or of those who did not step forward to ask for amnesty as 
in the case of South Africa.32 Transitional justice should not only be understood as backward-
looking: punishing wrong-doers, compensating victims for their losses and revealing the truth 
            
 Press, 
17, p.100. 
28 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, (2003), p.10. 
29 Ibid. 
30Antje du Bois_Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, United Kingdom, Cambridge University
(2007), p.300. 
31 Frank Hadmann, A Different Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognition, a paper, (2006), p.4. 
32 Maryam Kamali, supra note 
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about the past; but as forward-looking terms.33 Pursuant to this alternative, peace and justice 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. Each model of 
transitional justice addresses a particular need on the part of victims, and indeed for the 
ociety at large.34 Thus, our approach to transitional justice must be comprehensive. 
 and equality to 
retributive character of justice.38  
                                                
s
 
The purpose of the discussion is not to champion any of the specific alternatives. Rather it is 
hoped to elucidate the ongoing contrasts different models of transitional justice. As a matter 
of fact, there is no single formula applicable for all transitional societies. Some argue that the 
choice between prosecution and non-prosecution alternatives should depend on what one is 
seeking to achieve. For instance, some societies emerging from mass trauma may demand 
retribution, while others may focus on compensation; still others may concentrate on 
strengthening democratic institutions.35 If different societies want different things, and if 
prosecution is a more effective tool for achieving some goals than others, we can not 
presuppose that all societies in transition should choose prosecution.36 Here one should not be 
unmindful of the role and the interest of the international community in affecting the choice 
of mechanisms since grave human rights violations, as opposed to ordinary crimes, are not 
merely offenses on the particular traumatized society but on humanity as whole. The choice 
can not be left solely to either the international community or the local society. Thus, 
transitional justice must reflect the needs, desires, and political realities of the victimized 
society, while at the same time recognizing the international community’s rights and 
responsibility to intervene.37 In view of this, some authors state that the key to achieving 
lasting peace is broadening and incorporating various approaches in order to include 
restitution, acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, institutional reform
 
33 Eric Posener and Adrian Vermeul, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, Harvard Law Review, 
Vol.117:761, (2004), p.766. 
34 Andrea Armstrong, The Devil is the Details: the Challenges of Transitional Justice in Recent African Peace 
Agreements, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol.6 No.1, (2006), p.3. 
35 Miriam Aukerman , supra note 25, p.45. 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid, p.47 
38 Yolanda Gamarra Chopo, supra note 14, p.31. 
 15
Various approaches of transitional justice are complementary. Having said this, in the next 
chapter we are going to discuss how Ethiopia has dealt with its past. 
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 Chapter Three 
3 Transitional Justice in Ethiopia: Prosecution 
3.1 Atrocities  
 
Ethiopia is a diverse country consisting of more than eighty ethnic groups with numerous 
languages.39 Despite its diversity, the country was under an autocratic monarchy ruled by 
one-man, Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974). Nevertheless, the Emperor created a modern 
state constituting of a structured, centralised government, local governments and a judicial 
system, all which were governed by codified laws and a constitution.40 However, there were 
no independent legislature and judiciary. The constitution gave recognition for the absolute 
power and prerogatives of the Emperor in lieu of putting restrictions. In the countryside, 
peasants were reduced into serfs forced to hand over more than half of their products to their 
landlords. Thus, his long reign witnessed varied acts of political opposition including a couple 
of assassination attempts (in 1925 and in 1969).41 Only a handful of his opponents were 
however executed since the Emperor’s preferred mode of punishment was imprisonment, 
marginalization and banishment.42 
 
In 1960s and 1970s, opposition to the rule of the Emperor crystallised among the educated in 
the capital city of Addis Ababa and abroad in part as people became frustrated with the 
Emperor’s lack of attention to economic development and his refusal to end the feudal 
system.43 Several different groups including the military staged widespread protest while the 
government continued to be unresponsive to the political and economic demands of its 
people. The Provisional Military Administration Council (in Amharic Derg) was formed by 
junior officers of the Ethiopian army on the eve of the 1974 Popular Revolution. Finally the 
Derg managed to overthrow the monarchy rule through a widespread uprising without 
bloodshed and came to power on September 12, 1974. 
 
                                                 
39 Julie Mayfield, supra note 5, p.556. 
40 Ibid p.557. 
41 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, in Kjetil Tronvoll et al. (eds.), supra note 3, p.28. 
42 Ibid 
43 Julie Mayfield, supra note 5, p.557. 
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The revolution appeared to be successful without any bloodshed at the beginning. However 
soon after the change of the regime, the Derg cracked on the military units which precipitated 
the death of Lt.General Aman Andom (first leader of the Derg) and the execution of sixty 
former government officials in November 1974.44 From then on, the Derg abandoned the 
slogan of bloodless revolution; and much blood had to follow. 
 
Following the revolution, splits appeared between different radical elements as reflection of 
pre-existing divisions in student movement: the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party ( 
EPRP) as one group, and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Amharic acronym MEISON) 
another.45 While two of them espoused an almost indistinguishable brand of Marxism, 
MEISON supported and worked with the Derg, and the EPRP opposed the idea of revolution 
imposed from above, instead called the establishment of provisional people’s government.46 
The EPRP thus became enemy of the Derg. 
 
After having crushed the ruling class of the monarchy including the emperor, members of the 
royal family, ministers, senior officers of the army, landed aristocrats and the patriarch, the 
Derg turned on the ‘anti-revolutionaries’  and ‘anti-unity’ elements which were accused of 
sabotaging the revolution.47 The Derg began a campaign of the “Red Terror” against the 
EPRP (supported by most students and elites) claiming that the latter had started the “White 
Terror”. The Red Terror was a campaign of urban counter-insurgency waged in the capital of 
Addis Ababa and provincial towns against the campaign of which the Derg called White 
Terror advanced by EPRP.48 At beginning of the Red Terror, the Derg and its ally MEISON 
launched a massive campaign against EPRP which resulted in hundreds of members and 
sympathizers of the latter to be incarcerated. The EPRP, on its part, began to kill the cadres 
and leaders of the opposite camp by invoking the act of self-defence. As result, the Derg 
brutally began to kill people suspected to be members of EPRP and left the bodies on the 
streets as a warning to others. After some time, the EPRP lost its prominent members and 
leaders, and the Derg turned its attention to its own ally, MEISON. As a consequence, many 
members of MEISON were killed. At the climax stage of the terror, every revolutionary 
                                                 
44 Bahru Zewde, supra note 41, p.31. 
45 Human Rights Watch, Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New York, An African Watch 
Report, (1991), p.101. 
46 Julie Mayfield, supra note 5, p.559. 
47 Firew Kebede, The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia, Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2007), 
p.3. 
48 Human Rights Watch/Africa, Ethiopia: Reckoning under the Law, New York, Human Rights Watch, (1994), 
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became a law unto him and had an unrestricted license to kill “counter-revolutionaries”.49 
Both EPRP and MEISON became the target of the terror. 
 
During the Red Terror, thousands of people were arrested, disappeared, tortured, and 
murdered. In some instances, families of the disappeared and murdered had to pay the 
government for the bullet wasted to kill their family member, and only by doing this could 
they recover the body.50 No one knows how many people were exactly killed, imprisoned, or 
forced to flee abroad on account of the campaign of the Red Terror. According to Bahru 
Zewde, the generation gap left behind this Terror is akin to the gap that attended the 
Graziane’s massacre of February 1937 during fascist Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia, when the 
most agile and promising minds were targeted for liquidation.51 The main target of the Red 
Terror was a generation of urban people with at least minimal education. Most agree that the 
best and the brightest perished in the process. In addition to the campaign of Red Terror, the 
Derg was fighting terrible wars with different ethnic-based insurgencies and with Somalia, 
which were marked by widespread human rights and humanitarian law violations.52 Between 
1976 and the late of 1980s, 1.5 million Ethiopians are estimated to have died, disappeared or 
been injured as a result of the Red Terror (1976-1978), famine manipulation, forced 
relocation, and collectivization programmes.53 
 
3.2   Dealing with the past 
 
In May 1991 the communist/military regime headed by the former president Mengistu 
Hailemariam was overthrown by the military forces of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), ending 
seventeen years of repressive rule by the Derg regime. Among the immediate problems facing 
the EPRDF was what to do with the high ranking the Derg officials who carried out the Red 
Terror and were accused of committing atrocities against students, intellectuals and other 
persons deemed threatening the military junta.54 The issue of how to address the past 
injustices became a crucial test of the newly established Ethiopian government as a 
                                                 
49 Bahru Zewde, supra note 41, p.37. 
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transitional regime. The EPRDF had different choices to opt for in order to deal with the past 
human rights wrongs. Nonetheless, it decided to pursue criminal justice without, at least 
publicly, discussing other models of transitional justice, amnesty and reconciliation. In fact, 
there were indigenous options like amnesty that the Ethiopian government could have 
considered as an alternative or complementary to the retributive justice.55 According to the 
leaders of the current government of Ethiopia, there were three reasons to opt criminal 
prosecution during transition: first, the scope of human rights abuses is as heinous as to be a 
concern of the international community; second, a line needed to be drawn between the 
present and the past; and third, a court trial is a legal process that all Ethiopians were 
accustomed to and for which its judgement would be respected and perceived as impartial.56 
Actually, the contributory factors for the choice of criminal prosecution were the legacy of the 
past, the entire shift of balance of power and the international context of at time of the 
transition.57  
 
When the EPRDF took power in 1991, it detained roughly 2000 former government officials, 
including kebele (smallest administrative units in the country) leaders and members, on the 
suspicion that they authorised or were in some way involved in the brutality of the Derg 
regime.58 After a year of detention, the transitional government began to put a mechanism in 
place for handling the detainees who had to wait to be charged. Thus, in accordance with  
Proclamation No.22/92 of 8 August 1992, the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) was 
established and mandated to investigate and prosecute “any person having committed or 
responsible for the commission of an offence by abusing his position in the party, the 
government or mass organisations under the Derg - WPE regime.”59 As envisaged in article 6 
and the preamble of the proclamation, the SPO mandate has two objectives: (1) to bring those 
criminally responsible for human rights violations and/or corruption to justice, and (2) to 
establish for public knowledge and for posterity a historical record of the abuses of the Derg 
regime. 
 
Pursuant to its mandate the SPO began the process of gathering evidence and interviewing 
witnesses. In fact, the initial stages of the SPO were also occupied with strengthening the 
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office by hiring enough staff and raising money to expand its operation. The SPO created four 
teams, each of which focuses on the gathering evidence relevant to a particular abuse 
committed by the Derg regime: the Red Terror, forced relocation, war crimes, and 
manipulation of famine relief.60 In effect, the SPO came up with dozens of documentary 
evidence and a substantial amount of eyewitness testimony. In this respect, Mayfield pointed 
out that the SPO has done an immense amount of work in collecting and cataloguing 
evidence: 309,215 pages of relevant government documents (many with clear signatures of 
high ranking officials) were collected, and 3,000 witnesses were prepared.61 In addition to 
this, forensic teams were searching for and exhuming dozens of mass graves which contain 
the bodies of murdered civilians.62 
 
 In view of the first objective, the SPO has brought over 5000 former leaders and other 
officials to justice for crimes allegedly committed while they were in power from 1974-
1991.63 The defendants were categorised into three main groups: (a) policy makers (146 
defendants) - senior government officials and military commanders – those who deliberated 
on and designed the plan of genocide in their effort to eliminate their political opponent; (b) 
field commanders (2133 defendants) - both military and civilians who commanded the forces, 
groups and individuals that carried out the violations; (c) material offenders – individuals 
perpetrators( soldiers, police, officers, interrogators) who involved in material commission of 
the crime in line with the nation wide plan.64  
 
In relation to its second objective, the SPO has not yet done anything separately. Article 6 of 
the enabling proclamation of the SPO has declared that investigating and instituting 
proceedings against any person responsible for the atrocities is within the power of the Office. 
However, this particular provision is silent about the task of establishing a historical record. 
Instead of being listed within the powers of the Office, such objective is only found in the 
preamble of the proclamation; which is as follows: “it is in the interest of a just historical 
obligations to record for posterity the brutal offences, the embezzlement of property 
perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia and to educate the people and make them aware of 
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those offences in order to prevent the recurrence of such a system of government.”65 Some 
argue that the omission of establishing a historical record from article 6 implies that 
establishing a historical record is not in the office’s priority.66 In this regard, this writer is of 
the opinion that the legislature deliberately omitted the task of establishing and recording the 
truth about the past from the said article, for such objective can be served through 
investigation and prosecution. In fact, large volumes of documentary evidence along with the 
testimonies of witnesses, and evidence from defendants’ side can play a significant role in 
establishing a historical record. Thus, the omission is not to make the task of establishing 
historical record a secondary matter, rather to avoid an overlapping function of the Office. 
 
3.3   Red Terror Trials 
3.3.1 Charges 
 
As said, with the missions to create a historical record of the alleged abuses of human rights 
of the former military regime, and to bring to justice those criminally responsible for heinous 
human rights violations, the Office of Special Prosecutor (SPO) carried out investigation and 
collected evidence. Following the investigation, in October 1994, the SPO launched charges 
against the 73 top Derg officials including the former president Mengistu before the Federal 
High Court. The charges filed against these officials were based on genocide in violation of 
article 281 of the 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia or alternatively on aggravated homicide, and 
wilful bodily injury in violation of articles 522 and 538 of the same code respectively, for it is 
possible to file alternative charges as per article 113 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure 
Code where it is doubtful what offence has been committed..67 Additionally, they were 
charged for the crimes of abuse of power and unlawful detention in violation of articles 414 
and 416 of the Penal Code of Ethiopia.68  
 
Three years later in December 1997, the SPO also charged a total number of 5,198 people (of 
whom 2,246 were already in detention, while 2,952 were charged in absentia) before the 
Federal High Court, and  before regional Supreme Courts through delegation which otherwise 
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falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.69 The vast majority of defendants were 
charged with genocide and war crimes, and faced alternative charges of having committed 
aggravated homicide and wilful injury. For instance, the SPO prepared charges against fifty 
four defendants with war crimes as per article 282 of the Penal Code.70 Under the Ethiopian 
Penal Code, war crimes are defined using reference to customary international law and 
international humanitarian conventions. 
 
According to Mayfield, at the beginning there was the question of whether domestic or 
international law should apply as a basis for charges; however, the SPO later decided to use 
the Ethiopian Penal Code.71 The use of the domestic code in lieu of international law to file 
charges of genocide and war crimes was believed to provide the following advantages to the 
SPO.72 First, the definition of genocide under article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code is 
broader than the generally accepted definition of genocide under international law. As defined 
under Genocide Convention, genocide consists of acts committed “with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group…”73 The Ethiopian Penal 
Code has expanded the list of targeted groups by adding political groups. Using the domestic 
code allowed the SPO to cast a more inclusive net, for the acts of the defunct regime had been 
directed at political groups like EPRP, MEISON and other insurgents. Article 281 of the 
Penal Code goes: 
 
       Genocide; Crimes against Humanity 
 
Whosoever, with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
religious or political group, organises, orders, or engages in, be it in time of war or in 
time of peace: 
(a) killings, bodily harm, or serious injury to the physical or mental health of 
members of the group in anyway whatsoever; or 
(b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its members or 
their progeny; or 
(c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of people or children, or their placing 
under living conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance, 
is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five years to life, or, in cases of 
exceptional gravity, with death.74(Emphasis added) 
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From the heading and the whole wording of this article, one can easily note three distinctive 
features of the Ethiopian Penal Code that are not envisaged in the 1948 Genocide Convention 
to which Ethiopia is a party since 1948. The first unique feature is inferred from the title of 
the provision which appears to treat genocide and crimes against humanity as a single 
offence. When we read the content of the article, it is more or less similar with definition of 
genocide under international law. The inclusion of crimes against humanity under the 
definition of genocide severely limits the scope of application of the provision on a range of 
heinous violations of human rights that do not fit into the definition of genocide, but that 
could have been validly as crimes against humanity.75 However, one can argue that crimes 
against humanity as an international crime has already acquired the status of customary law 
and existed as a distinct crime under international criminal law. Hence, the very strange 
merge of the two crimes under Ethiopia Penal Code can mean nothing in practice. The other 
unique feature of this article is the incorporation of the act of transferring people or children 
to constitute genocide which is not a case under international law; the latter refers only the 
transfer of children. Lastly, as per the Penal Code of Ethiopia, the crimes of genocide may be 
perpetrated against political groups in addition to ethnic, national, racial or religious groups. 
Acts targeting politically defined groups are, as discussed, excluded from the purview of 
article II of the Genocide Convention. The inclusion of political groups makes the Ethiopia 
criminal law different from the Genocide Convention. In this regard, the Ethiopian Penal 
Code goes beyond what is stipulated in the Genocide Convention. 
 
Second, the use of international law as an independent basis for charges of war crimes might 
pose problem since it has traditionally been conceived that international law requires the 
armed conflict to be international in scope.76 And the alleged offences in Ethiopia had taken 
place in an internal armed conflict. To escape such limitation, the only way to charge the 
detainees with war crimes was to charge them by domestic law, which does not require the 
conflict to be international.  
 
Third, the SPO might want to lay charges under the domestic code in order to use the death 
penalty, for the Ethiopian Penal Code provides for death penalty for crimes of homicide, 
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genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.77 In fact, several death sentences were 
imposed in the long series of the Red Terror Trials.78 
 
3.3.2 Proceedings 
 
The main Red Terror Trial against the 73 top officials came to an end when the Ethiopian 
Federal High Court, after 12 years of trial, convicted all but one of the accused on 12 
December 2006 for genocide, crimes against humanity and wilful bodily injury.79 They were 
sentenced on 11 January 2007 for terms ranging from life to 23 years’ of rigorous 
imprisonment. One defendant was acquitted.80 Having been dissatisfied with the decision of 
the Federal High Court, the SPO filed an appeal before the Federal Supreme Court. So did the 
defendants for leniency of punishment. Eventually, this writer has come to know that the 
appellate court sentenced the former president Mengistu Hailemariam to death in his absence 
on 26 May 2008 (a week before the submission of this thesis), along with 17 senior officials 
of his regime, overturning a previous life term on appeal. Of all the people originally charged, 
33 had been in custody since 1991, 14 others had died in custody and 25 were tried in their 
absence including the former president Mengistu Hailemariam, who had asylum in 
Zimbabwe.81  
 
Mengistu and his co-accused were charged with 211 counts of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, or alternatively with aggravated homicide and wilful bodily injury. After having 
been served with the statement of charges and given time to their defence, the defendants 
through their legal counsels contended the charges on several grounds, among others: 
immunity of the head of state, the status of article 281 of the penal code, illegal political 
groups, and statutory limitations. Now let us see the objections of the defence counsels, the 
counter-arguments of the SPO and the rulings of the court.  
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By citing article 4 of the 1955 Ethiopian Constitution, the defence counsels raised the 
immunity of the head of state as an objection against the charges.82 They claimed that the 
Provisional Military Administrative Council (Derg) as a head of state has right not to be 
charged. Thus, the defendants as members of the said Council are not accountable for acts 
they committed since deeds of a head of state are acts of the state. The SPO, on its part; 
contended that such an immunity did not apply in case of genocide as per article 4 of the 
Genocide Convention, and the defendants could not be granted such an immunity by any 
measure of law.83 The SPO supported its argument by raising the principles of individual 
criminal responsibility, equality before the law, and international precedents. It was also 
stressed that the defendants were not heads of states; and article 4 of the 1955 Revised 
Constitution of Ethiopia gave immunity to the emperor alone and there could be no other 
beneficiary of the provision.84 After having examined the arguments of both, the court 
overruled the defence of immunity based on the principle of equality before the law and the 
personal nature of the immunity due to the emperor.85 
 
The defence counsels also argued in favour of their clients on the ground of statutory 
limitations mainly related to charges of bodily injury, abuse power and unlawful detention 
whose period of limitation is fifteen years at most as per article 226 of the Penal Code.86 On 
the contrary, the SPO argued that the period of limitation should begin to be counted after the 
fall of the regime, for the Derg era warranted the acts of the defendants.87 And this defence 
was rendered unacceptable. 
 
Furthermore, the defence counsels objected the charges based on the content of article 281 of 
the Penal Code. As said above, the Genocide Convention and the Ethiopian Penal Code define 
genocide differently in scope. Genocide under the latter is broad enough to include the act of 
targeting political groups. The defence counsels were against the inclusion of political groups 
within the ambit of article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code, saying that it is null and void by 
the 1955 Constitution of Ethiopia.88 This Constitution made international treaties ratified by 
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Ethiopia as supreme as itself in the hierarchy of law. That is to say the Genocide convention, 
which was ratified by Ethiopia in 1949, is on equal footing with the 1955 Constitution as 
opposed to other ordinary laws including the Penal Code. And in case of inconsistency 
between the Convention and the Penal Code, the former obviously prevails over the latter. 
And hence, they objected the inclusion of political groups as a targeting group under the 
definition of genocide. Alternatively if it were said that it validly includes political groups, the 
victims were not, they argued, members of one or other political groups. The political parties 
listed in the charges were not formally registered and enjoyed legal protection. In order to 
refute the defence of the accused, the SPO presented its counter argument against the 
objection as follows. The 1955 Constitution, which made the Convention overriding the 
provision of the penal code and in effect rendered the inclusion of political group as a targeted 
group void, was suspended when the defendants came to power.89 Thus, the defendants could 
not use the already suspended law by themselves in their defence.  Their argument appears to 
imply that when the 1955 Constitution was suspended; the stipulation about the act of 
targeting political group under article 281 of the Penal Code which had been repealed by the 
Constitution would revive. As to the alternative defence of the accused, the SPO argued that 
the defendants had branded every victims as members of one or the other political party or 
group.90 It did not make up the excuse that those who were killed were members of an 
unregistered underground organization. 
 
In relation to inconsistency between the Penal Code and the Convention, the Court ruled 
that Ethiopia could go beyond the minimum standards laid down in the Genocide 
Convention. In favour of the ruling of the court, this writer argues that human rights are 
minimal standards to maintain a decent or minimally good life for human being. States are 
duty bound to comply with these minimal standards. Any unjustifiable deviation below the 
minimal norms is prohibited. But states can go beyond the minimal standards to achieve the 
best for human beings.  In this regard, it is correctly pointed out that: 
 
Article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code framed to give wider human rights protection 
should not be viewed as if it is in contradiction with Genocide Convention. As long as 
Ethiopia does not enact a law that minimizes the protection of rights afforded by the 
convention, the mere fact of being state party to the Convention doesn’t prohibit the 
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government from enacting a law which provides a wider range of protection than the 
convention. Usually international instruments provide only minimum standards and it is 
the duty of a state party to enact a law that assist their implementation.91 
 
In addition, the defence counsels raised another objection that part of article 281 was 
repealed by Proclamations No.110/1976 and 129/1976 which provided government 
authorities at all levels with the authority to destroy and take any necessary measures 
against anti-revolutionary and anti-unity political groups.92 Since the defendants were 
under legal duty of agitating and rallying the broad masses for the purpose of attacking and 
destroying anti-revolutionaries and anti-unities, they should not be penalized. The SPO 
response on this issue was that there was no such a law authorising or requiring the 
commission of genocide; even if it were said that there was a law permitting such acts, it 
could only be a law of the jungle, not that of the civilised world.93 The centre of this 
controversy was whether the Proclamations that allowed the authorities to take actions 
against anti-revolutionary and anti-unity forces repealed that part of article 281 of the Penal 
Code that labels targeting political groups in view of destroying in part or in full as acts of 
genocide.94  
 
To the controversy, the Court ruled that no such repeal had occurred. However, one 
dissenting judge concluded that part of article 281(labelling the acts of targeting political 
groups as genocide) was inconsistent with the aforementioned Proclamations. The judge 
invoked article 10 of Proclamation No.1/1974 which declared all prior laws including the 
Penal Code remain in force so long as they are in line with the laws enacted by the 
Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) - Derg.95 Therefore, in the 
contradiction between part of article 281(regarding the act of targeting political groups as 
genocide) and the Proclamations (authorising the defendants to destroy anti-
revolutionaries); the dissenting judge held that the latter laws had to prevail over the 
former. Nonetheless, he maintained the notion of genocide under article 281 as recognised 
in international law.  
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This dissenting opinion was also upheld when the Court issued its judgment on the merits 
of the case. The Court, by majority, found the accused guilty of 211 counts of genocide, 
homicide, illegal imprisonment and illegal confiscation of property. In contrast to the 
majority, the dissenting judge was of the opinion that the accused should have been 
convicted of homicide and causing wilful bodily injury, not genocide, for the actions of the 
accused at the time were lawful and measures taken against members of political groups did 
not amount to genocide in international law.96 The dissenting judge was criticised for his 
failure to justify why the laws that purportedly repealed part of article 281 could not have 
also repealed article 522 on homicide so long as homicide was committed in order to 
eliminate political groups as authorised by Proclamations No.110/1976 and 129/1976.97 As 
against this criticism, this writer found out in judgement that the dissenting judge already 
justified why the alternative charges of homicide and wilful bodily injury were not 
repealed. Supporting the dissenting judge, the writer argues that the defendants should have 
been convicted by alternative charges of homicide and wilful bodily injury, rather than 
genocide. It is, without violating international obligations, possible to enact a law which 
does not consider the act of targeting political groups as genocide. Contrary to this, we can 
not legalize the act of homicide or wilful bodily injury by promulgation of law, without 
violating the minimum standards of human rights. Thus the aforementioned Proclamations 
did not and could not repeal article 522 on homicide and article 538 on wilful bodily injury 
while it did so part of article 281 of the Penal Code. 
 
3.3.3 The Rights of Defendants 
 
The swift decision of the EPRDF to prosecute the members of the defunct regime for 
atrocities allegedly committed, rightfully earned the respect of the international community at 
the start. As time went on, however, it became clear that the criminal proceedings would not 
be or could not be held in conformity with the international human rights standards. Some 
observers were concerned by the slow pace of the proceedings. In the summer of 1994, a 
segment of the international community argued that since these former Derg officials had 
remained in prison for three years without having formally been charged, there was a danger 
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that their rights were being violated.98 In response to this, the SPO filed its first charge against 
the top Derg officials in October 1994. The initial detention of 2000 prisoners occurred before 
the creation of the SPO; by the time it was created, staffed and operational, they had already 
been detained for up to 18 months.99 The prolonged detention without charge, the delay of 
trial as result of many and long lasting adjournments, and lack of resources for defence 
preparation have become the most pressing human rights concerns. 
 
The detainees have a number of rights recognised in the domestic law as well as the 
international human rights instruments. According to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, every one has the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal in the determination of any criminal charges against him; and has also the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law in a public trial at which he has 
had all the guarantees for his defence.100 The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia (which 
was later replaced by the 1995 Constitution) internalised those rights by saying that 
“individual rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be respected 
fully without any limits whatsoever.”101 By the same fashion, the new Constitution also 
extends the same protection by stating that the interpretation of rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the constitution shall be in line with the international instruments adopted by Ethiopia.102 In 
June1993, Ethiopia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
which entered into force after three months. As a party to the Covenant, Ethiopia has 
undertaken to respect and ensure for all individuals within its jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in Covenant as indicated in article 2 of this covenant. Besides, there are procedural 
safeguards stipulated in the 1961 Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia. The arbitrary arrest 
and the prolonged detention without charge are in violation of the Charter and the Criminal 
procedure Code of Ethiopia. However, until 1993 the Ethiopian government was not under 
obligation to honour acts which could be violations of ICCPR and not covered by the 
domestic law.  
 
In many instances, the procedural safeguards accorded to the detainees were not adhered in 
the process. For instance, as discussed, a considerable number of people were kept in 
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detention without having been charged. Pursuant to article 9 of the ICCPR, an arrested person 
has the right to be informed the reasons for his arrest and promptly informed any charge 
against him. Following his arrest, he should be brought promptly before court and entitled to 
trial within reasonable time or to release.  Besides, he can apply before court of law for his 
release (habeas corpus) if he is deprived of his liberty unlawfully. As a party to the Covenant, 
Ethiopia has a duty to observe international standards prohibiting prolonged arbitrary 
detention. Putting aside the prior detention, even after the entry into force of the ICCPR, those 
people who were charged in 1994 (save those being tried in absentia) were detained for one 
year without charge. Furthermore, the vast majority of the detainees waited to be charged 
until 1997. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared the detentions to be 
arbitrary and requested that Ethiopian government takes steps to conform the situation with 
articles 9 and 10 of the UDHR, and articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.103  
 
 The Ethiopian government, on its part, tried to justify the detention by raising the danger of 
the defendants’ flight, risk of further offence, suppression of evidence and suborning of 
witnesses104. Article 7 the SPO Establishment Proclamation No.22/92 further restricts the 
rights of the detainees by barring them from filing habeas corpus petitions for six months 
which in effect legalised the detention. This article reads as: 
 
 The provisions of habeas corpus under article 177 of the Civil Procedure Code [of 
Ethiopia] shall not apply for persons detained prior to the coming into force of this 
proclamation for a period of six months starting from the effective date of this 
proclamation in matters under the jurisdiction of the special prosecutor as indicated in 
article 6 thereof.105 
 
Upon the expiry of the time limit, the detainees submitted the writ of habeas corpus to the 
Federal High Court since they had been arrested without warrant and not brought before 
court for long. Consequently, 200 detainees were released.106 At this moment, the SPO 
applied to a lower court for arrest warrant and remand for sufficient time to complete its 
investigations, which more or less closed the petition of habeas corpus. Sadly, the 
permission that the lower court gave to the SPO to detain such individuals indefinitely was 
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endorsed by the higher courts.107 Here, it is appropriate to cite the decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court given on one suspect. In the case, the Supreme Court held that the 15 days 
limitation for filing a charge provided in article 109 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 
will not apply to cases which fall with in the jurisdiction of the Office of Special 
Prosecutor by virtue article 7(2) of Proclamation No.22/92.108 
 
Article 20(1) of the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia stipulates that an accused has the rights 
to be tried within a reasonable time after having been charged. Similar entitlement is 
enshrined under article 9(3) of the ICCPR. However, the Red Terror Trials have taken 
more than a decade. For instance, the trial of the 73 top officials, which was opened in 
1994, came to an end in 2007.  And here we should not forget the fact that several 
defendants have been put in custody since 1991. For those people, the judgment was given 
after sixteen years of imprisonment. This writer argues that there was undue delay of trial 
in contradiction to the international human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia as well 
as the constitutional guarantees. One may raise the number of defendants, complexity of 
gathering of immense amount of evidence, interviewing thousands of witnesses, and 
securing of adequate personnel as justifications for delay in trials. But still it is very hard to 
justify such delay by any means in any legal jurisdiction. As stated earlier, one of the 73 
top officials was acquitted after long trial. As this writer does not have information since 
when the acquitted person was detained; he simply wants to raise one general question 
instead of commenting on the acquitted person. What would happen if one of the detainees 
found innocent after sixteen years of detention or one served long years of imprisonment 
more than he had to? The defendants were denied right to be tried within reasonable period 
of time although adequate safeguards exist both under domestic and international law for 
the protection of the rights of the defendants.  
 
Another central issue relating to the rights of the defendants is the right to be represented 
by legal counsel. In regard to the 73 top Derg officials, the issue of legal representation 
came to exist after the charge was read out to the defendants. When they were asked how 
they would defend their case, most of them pleaded that a state appointed counsels 
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assigned to them, for they were in no financial position to hire a legal counsel.109 As 
stipulated in the ICCPR and the Ethiopian Constitution, an accused has the right to be 
represented by legal counsel of his choice or to have legal assistance assigned to him if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.110 The Public Defender’s Office (PDO) was 
established in 1994 under the supervision of the Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court.111 
Originally the office consisted of five attorneys, only one of whom was an experienced 
trial attorney, but later the staff had grown to twenty attorneys.112 The operation of the 
office suffered from administrative and financial problems. 
 
Given the grave nature of the charges, the means of proving the innocence of each 
defendant would undoubtedly require a qualified defence lawyer. However, except those 
who hired their own defence counsels, all the indigent defendants were represented by 
counsels who do not have formal legal training and experience in serious trial 
proceedings.113 In addition, a single public defender was assigned to defend more than fifty 
defendants, which is improbable to think that the defender could analyze the case of each 
defendant individually before the defence.114 Those who could afford to defray were able 
to defend themselves through experienced lawyers while others not.  
 
3.4  Significance of the Red Terror Trials 
 
As has been said in the preceding section, the most fundamental flaw of Red Terror Trial is 
failure to ensure accountability while respecting the rights of the defendants in conformity 
with the international human rights standards and domestic law. There have been serious 
breaches of the rights of the defendants since the pre-trial stage. In the process the human 
rights have been violated while pursuing to address the past wrongs and ensure the 
protection of human rights. The scope of prosecution, the relative absence of infrastructure, 
the shortage of qualified lawyers, and the questionable impartiality and competence of the 
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court have contributed to violations of the basic rights of the defendants.115 In relation to 
the Red Terror Trials, one scholar has rightfully said the following:  
 
The justifications for a policy that deals with systematic human rights violations lie in 
its fairness and effectiveness, and in the wider lessons to be learnt from the process of 
reckoning. The crucially important task confronting the new Ethiopian government was 
ensuring accountability for the past human rights violations, while upholding due 
process and fundamental human rights in the process. The government thus far has 
failed in this dual task. Another disquieting and perhaps singular feature of the 
Ethiopian experience is the apparent popular indifference about the trials. This is a 
serious limitation given the fact that the importance of the lessons to be learnt from 
such trials very much depends on the quality of debate they generate and the 
opportunity they provide for a new beginning that is based on a society-wide self re-
examination. Failure in these respects may only postpone the controversy for the future; 
thereby depriving the society of the pivotal opportunity to achieve genuine 
reconciliation and a closure to the country’s contested past.116 
 
As pointed out in the preceding quote and reported at different times, the process received 
low public attention. The atrocities committed in the past are no longer fresh in the psyche 
of the population. The indifference of the public in the trial can be attributable to everyday 
political, social and economical challenges faced by the Ethiopian people.117 
 
The other problem of the trial is its sole focus on the members of the Derg regime. As 
indicated in article 6 of Proclamation No. 22/1992, the SPO is mandated to investigate and 
institute an action only against the members of the defunct regime. The crimes were 
committed within the context of a revolution, and the political parties that were targeted were 
allegedly themselves assassinating top military officers of the Derg while the country was 
also fighting against external invaders and secessionist movements.118 The brutal measures 
taken by the targeted political groups have not been investigated by the SPO. In effect, many 
more, who took part in the atrocities, remain unpunished. So the trials appeared to be a 
victor’s justice which permits a cycle of revenge.  
 
At this juncture, one may wonder whether or not the option chosen by Ethiopia to address its 
past is a just solution that is acceptable to the victims of the atrocities and is suitable to create 
stable future. It is very hard to answer this question in abstract, for there is no single formula 
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for the coming to terms with years of human rights abuses. Neither prosecution nor amnesty is 
capable of handling the complexity a post conflict situation in all circumstances. As discussed 
in the preceding chapter, in addressing such issue, we should take into account among other 
things the needs, the desires and the political realities of the traumatized society. And we 
should, to the extent possible, look at the past to correct grievances while creating a viable 
present and future for every group after a conflict. 
 
As mentioned above, the process does not ensure accountability for the past human rights 
violations by respecting the fundamental human rights of the accused. Nor does it guarantee 
the non-repetition of the past misdeeds, for there is a recurrence of human rights violations in 
the country as we shall see in the next chapter. Instead the prosecution appears to perpetuate a 
cycle of revenge or be seen as victor’s justice and politically motivated. Given the lack of 
independence of the under-equipped Ethiopian judiciary, and the number of people charged 
(5271 defendants throughout the country),119 relying fully on the criminal justice alone should 
have been seen unaffordable. That is to say amnesty and reconciliation could have been 
considered along with criminal justice like in South Africa. As one commentator put it 
sometimes a collective form of accountability may be a less costly way of healing the wounds 
of the society than conducting individualised criminal trail.120 In such a case, it is reasonable 
to pursue amnesty with certain conditions.  
 
In the course of the trial, 33 top former Derg officials formally asked the government to give 
them a public forum so that they could beg the society for a pardon for mistakes made 
knowingly or unknowingly while in power.121 However, no official response was given to 
them.122  Even at this stage, it could have been gone beyond prosecution. Had they been given 
a forum, the forum might have been used to facilitate reconciliation between the victims and 
the perpetrators by acknowledging and publicising what truly happened. Besides, the process 
might have got public attention and thereby given a lesson to the society. It would also have 
enabled the defendants to tell their version of the story. 
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So far, we have tried to discuss how the country has dealt with its past. Conspicuously, 
dealing with the past wrongs is not a sufficient condition, though necessary, to create a human 
rights culture in a country. Instead, transitional states should further take steps (including the 
entrenchment of human rights norms in the domestic system and the realization of their full 
enforcement, establishment of independent judiciary and independent human rights 
monitoring institutions) to guarantee the non-repetition of the past wrongs and creation of 
stable future. In this context, we are going to discuss, in the next chapter, about the additional 
measures that Ethiopia has taken post 1991. 
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Chapter Four 
4 Attempts made beyond Addressing the Past 
4.1 Ratification and Incorporation Human Rights Instruments  
 
In addition to addressing the past state-sponsored human rights violations through criminal 
justice, the current government of Ethiopia has made various attempts for the creation of a 
human rights culture in the country. Some of these attempts are the ratification of human 
rights instruments, the incorporation of human rights norms in the domestic legal system, 
revising domestic laws in line with human rights norms and the establishment of human rights 
institutions like ombudsman and Human Rights Commission. 
 
Before embarking upon the steps taken by the Ethiopian government, it is appropriate to 
devote few paragraphs for international human rights instruments. Modern international 
human rights law is a post World War II phenomenon since its development can be attributed 
to the monstrous human rights violations committed during the war.123 With the establishment 
of the United Nations in 1945, the international community pursued a goal of “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.”124  In this regard, the first remarkable step taken by the 
UN was the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly 
on 10 December 1948. The Declaration has become to be recognised as a common standard 
for all peoples and all nations towards the promotion of human dignity. The adoption of such 
a comprehensive human rights document was a remarkable achievement that an international 
organization had for the first time in history agreed on a joint statement on human rights.125 
 
The standards setting gave way to the promulgation of legally binding international human 
rights documents of the 1966: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights along with its two Optional Protocols, and the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are usually referred to as the ‘International 
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Bill of Human Rights.’126 In addition to the Bill of Human Rights, the UN has through time 
adopted the various other supplementary conventions dealing with the specific types of 
human rights violations. Finally, a sufficient number of basic human rights conventions are in 
place giving expression to these standards. Although there is a general agreement on the 
nature of the fundamental human rights enshrined in these conventions, it is important to 
secure comprehensive global ratification of the basic human rights instruments so as to 
complete the framework.127 
 
In this context, the current government of Ethiopia ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,128 and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,129 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child,130 Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,131 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.132 In 
the past two defunct regimes, Ethiopia ratified only the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,133 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination,134 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women.135 
 
These international human rights instruments can be enforced and be effective where they are 
incorporated in the domestic legal system. In view of this, human rights norms have been 
enshrined in the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE 
Constitution). The Constitution consists of a comprehensive Bill of Rights including civil, 
political, economical, social and cultural rights as well as the rights to development and 
environmental rights. Besides, the right to self determination up to secession has also been 
guaranteed by the Constitution.136 The extension of the rights to self determination up to and 
including secession can perhaps be seen as one of a unique feature of the Constitution. The 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution are, as per article 13(2), made to be 
interpreted in light of international human rights instruments. The importance given to these 
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rights and freedoms is further illustrated by putting exceptionally an extra stringent 
amendment requirement.137 Amendment to human rights provisions of the Constitution can 
be introduced only when all regional legislatures approve the proposed amendment, plus the 
House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation approved the proposed 
amendment with a two-thirds majority vote in their separate meeting. Therefore, one can 
safely say that the current government has taken both a number of ratified human rights 
instruments and their incorporation in the national law one step further as compared to its 
predecessors. Having said this, we are going to discuss the status of the ratified human rights 
instruments under domestic law and the obligations owed to them. 
 
4.1.1 The Status of Human Rights Instruments 
 
The 1995 Constitution declares that “the Constitution is the supreme law of the land; and any 
law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of a state or public official which 
contravene the Constitution shall be of no effect.”138 The constitution also states that all 
international agreements including human rights instruments are considered as “an integral 
part of the law of the land” upon ratification.139 Once an international agreement is ratified, it 
is deemed to be part and parcel of the domestic law and enforced as though it were a 
legislation enacted by the parliament. Contrary to the supremacy clause, Article 13(2) of the 
Constitution stipulates the constitutional provisions pertaining to fundamental rights and 
freedoms should be “interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and international 
instruments adopted by Ethiopia.” The Bill of rights enshrined in the Constitution are 
subjected to special interpretive regime which seemingly puts the international human rights 
instruments superior in hierarchy of law to the Constitution. When we read article 9(1) & (4) 
on one hand and article 13(2) of the Constitution on the other, a controversy arises as to which 
one should prevail in case of inconsistency between the human rights provisions of the 
Constitution and the international human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia. Should the 
Constitution prevail by virtue article 9(1) or should the international human rights instrument 
take priority as per article 13(2) of the Constitution? 
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In regard to this controversy, there are two lines of argument. One line of argument is that the 
Constitution should prevail over the international human rights instruments. As indicated in 
its supremacy clause under article 9(1), the Constitution is superior to “all the laws of the 
land,” and any law, customary practice or decision of any organ in contradiction to it is null 
and void. Pursuant to article 9(4) of the Constitution, all international agreements including 
human rights conventions ratified by Ethiopia are part of the law of the land. Therefore, the 
Constitution should take the supremacy over human rights instruments, for the latter are part 
of the law of the land and the former assumes supremacy over all laws of the land. According 
to this line of argument, article 13(2) of the Constitution is enshrined in the Constitution so 
that international human rights instruments can be used as guidelines for interpretation of 
constitutional provisions if need be. And hence the latter are subordinate to the Constitution. 
 
On the other hand, from the cursory reading of article 13(2) of the Constitution, one can also 
catch another line of argument. Under this article the Constitution stipulates that fundamental 
freedoms and rights enshrined in the Constitution “shall be interpreted in a manner 
conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International 
Covenants of Human Rights and international human rights instruments adopted by Ethiopia.” 
This article requires human rights provisions of the Constitution to be interpreted in line with 
the international human rights instruments if interpretation is necessary. And in effect, the 
international human rights instruments adopted by Ethiopia appear to be superior to the 
human rights provisions of Constitution. In this line of argument, it is usually said that article 
13(2) is an exception to article 9(1) cum (4) of the Constitution. In principle the Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land. And this principle suffers from an exception. Thus, 
international human rights instruments ratified by the country are superior to or as equal as 
the Constitution in the hierarchy of laws. 
 
This writer does not believe that the international human rights instruments are superior to the 
Constitution. Perhaps, the framer of the Constitution might insert this provision, for most of 
the human rights provisions were directly taken from international human rights instruments. 
And it is logical to give a cross reference of its source as guidelines for interpretation in case 
of lack of clarity. So article 13 (2) of the Constitution simply gives a cross reference to the 
international human rights instruments during interpretation in lieu of placing them above the 
Constitution. For instance, if one of rights enshrined in the Constitution is not clear enough to 
be enforced, the interpreting organ should refer the international human rights instruments in 
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order to get the real meaning from its source. But what if the provision in the Constitution is 
clear enough but narrower in scope than a similar provision in one of international human 
instruments ratified by Ethiopia? Are we going to interpret the provision to widen its scope 
even if it is clear? For this writer, the answer is in the negative. And the Constitution should 
prevail as far as its provisions are clear to be implemented. The international human rights 
instruments are ratified by the House of Peoples’ Representatives which itself was created by 
virtue of the Constitution as a law making organ.140  It is hard to think the legislature can 
make a law or ratify a treaty which goes against its creator, the Constitution. Doing so is 
tantamount to amending the Constitution which requires very stringent requirements. 
 
4.1.2 Obligations to the Human Rights Instruments 
 
As opposed to the individual sovereign states, the community of nations has no international 
law making organ empowered to enact legally binging laws on all countries.141 Instead, states 
establish legally binding obligations among themselves by entering into an international 
agreement or through wide accepted state practice of a rule as customary international law.142 
As treaties under international law, the Covenants and other human rights treaties create 
legally binding obligations for the State that has ratified the instrument (the State Party). By 
becoming a party to the international human rights instruments, states incur three broad 
obligations: the duty to respect, to protect and to fulfil.143 These obligations in principle apply 
to all civil and political rights, and all economic, social and cultural rights, but the balance 
between them may vary according to the rights involved. These obligations require state to act 
positively or negatively. In the obligation to respect, states are obliged to refrain from acting 
in a way that amounts to violating the rights concerned – a negative duty. In the obligations to 
protect and fulfil, states are, on the other hand, required to take positive measures for the 
effective enjoyment and realization of the rights. 
 
The scope and nature of the obligations of states is defined under the human rights instrument 
to which a state is a party. For instance, the basic obligations that State Parties assume by 
ratifying the two major UN Covenants are set forth in common Article 2. In this regard, 
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article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains the 
basic duty imposed on states by the Covenant which reads as: 
 
1.  Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subjects to its jurisdiction the rights recognised 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind… 
2.  Where no already provided for by the existing legislative or other measures, each 
state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional process and with the provisions of the present 
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect 
to the rights recognised in the present Covenant. 
 
 The obligation owed to civil and political rights is traditionally viewed as an obligation to 
abstain from arbitrary intervention on the freedom and autonomy of the individual. 
However, the obligation is both negative and positive in nature. States parties are required 
to protect individuals not just against the act of violations of the covenant rights by its 
agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
rights. Besides, states are, as indicated in article 2(2) of the ICCPR, obliged to enact 
legislations and create the framework to prevent violations of rights and enable citizens 
enjoy their protected rights without the interference from other. Thus, states are required to 
take positive steps towards the effective enjoyment of rights.  
 
By the same token, economic, social and cultural rights incorporated in the ICESCR impose 
the three different types of obligations on states parties. As it was mentioned earlier, these 
different levels of obligations apply to all categories of human rights albeit the difference in 
degree of application to the right concerned. At the primary level, states parties are obliged to 
respect the free use of resources owned or at the disposal of the individual alone or in any 
form of association with others for the purpose of rights-related needs.144 The obligation to 
respect requires states to refrain from interference with the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights.  The obligation to protect requires states to prevent the violations of such 
rights by third parties (non-state actors, other states and non-governmental organisation), and 
the obligation to fulfil requires states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary 
and judicial and other measures towards the full realisation of such rights.145 Article 2 (1) of 
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the ICESCR describes the nature of the general legal obligations undertaken by States parties 
to the Covenant. This article stipulates: 
 
Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
The Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued guidance on the 
nature of states obligations in its General Comment 3. The Committee noted that while the 
Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints due to the 
limits of available resources, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short 
time after the Covenant’s entry into force for states parties.146  The fact that the full 
realization of a right is progressive does not mean that there is nothing that can be done 
immediately. Rather, there is an immediate obligation on the State Party to ensure, at the very 
least, minimum levels of each of the rights of the Covenant. 
                                                
 
Accordingly, Ethiopia is therefore under obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the rights 
enshrined in the human rights instruments to which the country is a party. In this respect, 
the Constitution provides that “all Federal and State legislative, executive and judicial 
organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to respect and enforce the 
provisions” of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.147 The 
primary responsibility of the legislature is to make laws which are in conformity with the 
provisions of the Constitution including the provisions of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Undoubtedly, the availability of specific national laws plays a great role in the 
implementation of human rights at the domestic level, though the legislations do not 
suffice on their own. In fulfilling its duty to fill the legal gap and bring the constitutional 
principles into reality, the Federal Legislature has enacted several specific laws such as the 
press law, labor law, Proclamation Establishing the National Election Board, Family law, 
Criminal law, and Proclamations Establishing Human Rights Commission and 
Ombudsman etc.148 Presently one can safely say that the legal framework for the 
protection and promotion of human rights has sufficiently been placed in the national law. 
 
146 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 3: The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations, UN Doc. CESCR/14/12/90 (1990), Para. 1. 
147 Proclamation No.1/1995, supra note 102, Article 13(1). 
148 Rakebe Messele, Enforcement of Human Rights in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, unpublished, (2002) P.24. 
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These laws are not self-executing; instead they need the action of the executive branch of 
government at all levels to be enforced. The executive is required to implement laws and 
develop policies in line with the fundamental rights and freedoms. In respect to 
enforcement of human rights, much work remains to be done. Similarly, the judiciary is 
obliged to respect and enforce human rights provisions as per the Constitution. However, 
contrary to the constitutional provisions, failure to comply with the due process of law like 
lengthy pretrial detention (as seen in the preceding chapter) is common in judicial system 
f Ethiopia. 
 
4.2  Establishment of Human Rights Institutions 
d institutionally. In this 
context, we are going to see the legal framework of these institutions. 
                                                
o
 
 The establishment of human rights institutions is very important to ensure the 
implementation of rights at national level. In addition to ratification human rights instruments 
and entrenchment of all categories of rights in its Constitution, as part of the creation of a 
human rights culture, Ethiopia has established human rights institutions; namely a Human 
Rights Commission and the institution of the Ombudsman. The Constitution gives the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives (Parliament) the power to establish them.149 Based on the power 
vested upon it, the Parliament enacted the enabling legislations of the two institutions and 
established them in 2000, five years after the promulgation of the Constitution. Unfortunately, 
these institutions took another five years to commence operations since their establishment. In 
the legal system the country, both the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman are 
new institutions which are designed to protect human rights and oversee maladministration. 
The establishment of such institutions is a step forward to the protection and promotion of 
human rights, and to the prevention of maladministration in the country. These institutions 
can play a major role in the implementation of domestic and international human rights norms 
in the country provided that they are independent both financially an
 
149  Proclamation No.1/1995, supra note 102, Article 55(14) & (15) 
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 4.2.1 Human Rights Commission 
 
In accordance with Article 55(14) of the FDRE Constitution, the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (Parliament) established the Commission by virtue of Proclamation No. 
210/2000 although the commission was not operational until 2005. The Commission has a 
constitutional base for its establishment which in effect shields the institution from being 
abolished by the act of the Executive or Parliament. Structurally the Commission is created as 
an independent organ of the Federal Government having its own legal personality and made 
accountable to the Parliament.150 In regard to its activities, the Commission should submit a 
periodic report to the Parliament in accordance with article 19(2) (g) of the Proclamation.  
 
In ensuring independence through appointment and dismissal of personnel of the 
Commission, the enabling legislation has put several safeguards in place. According to article 
8 of Proclamation No. 210/2000, the Commission is composed of a chief commissioner, a 
deputy chief commissioner, a commissioner heading the children and women affairs, others 
commissioners and the necessary staff. Article 10 of Proclamation No.210/2000 further 
stipulates that each commissioner should be appointed by a two-third vote of the Parliament 
upon the submission of nominees by “the Nomination Committee.”151 As per article 14 of 
Proclamation No.210/2000, the tenure of the appointees is guaranteed for five years with the 
possibility of re-appointment. An appointee can not be removed before the expiry of the term 
of the office unless the expressly stipulated removal grounds and procedures are met.152 
Procedurally, as indicated under article 16 of Proclamation No.210/2000, an appointee can be 
removed when the Parliament decides to that effect by a two-third majority vote based on the 
recommendation submitted to it by “Special Inquiry Tribunal.”153  Each appointee has also 
                                                 
150  Proclamation No.210/2000, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Establishment Proclamation, Negarit 
Gazeta, (2000) Article 3. 
151  The Nomination Committee, as per article 11 of the Proclamation No.210/2000, consists of the Speakers of 
the Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Federation, seven to be elected members from among the House of 
Federation, two members of the Parliament to be elected by joint agreement of opposition parties having seats in 
the Parliament, the president of the Federal Supreme Court, a representative of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a 
representative of the Ethiopian Islamic Council, a representative of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church and a 
Representative of the Ethiopian Catholic Church. The role of Committee is to recruit nominees who fulfil the 
criteria set by the law and submits them to the parliament for appointment. 
152  Proclamation No.210/2000, supra note 152, Articles 15 and 16 
153  The Special Inquiry Tribunal is, as per 17 of the Proclamation No.210/2000, composed of the Deputy 
Speaker of the Parliament, the Deputy Speaker of the House of Federation, three to be elected members of the 
Parliament, a member of the Parliament to be elected by the joint agreement of opposition parties having seats in 
 45
immunity form being arrested or detained without the permission of the Parliament unless 
they are caught red handed for serious offence.154 
 
The independence of the Commission is also manifested financially. Obviously, financially 
dependent institution is susceptible to manipulation and inducement of an organ from which 
the money comes. The availability of sufficient funding and a large degree of independence 
for drafting and proposing its own budget are key preconditions for giving and sustaining the 
independence of the Commission from any possible rules and procedures of government 
institutions dealing with the financial regime.155 To avoid financial dependence, the enabling 
legislation provides for the budget of the Commission to be prepared by the Chief 
Commissioner and submitted to the Parliament for approval.156 The commission has, as per 
article 36, also other sources of income like assistance and grant which are administered by it. 
However, given the human rights situation on one hand and the poor economy of the country 
on the other, limited financial resources can be a serious constraint to the Commission to 
discharge its responsibilities fully and nationwide. 
 
In the enabling legislation, the Parliament has spelled out the structure, functions and powers 
of the Commission. Article 6 of Proclamation No. 210/2000 states that the Commission has 
the powers and duties, among others, to ensure the respect of the constitutional human rights 
and freedoms, ensure the conformity of the laws, regulations, directives as well as decisions 
and orders of government with human rights, educate the public about human rights, and 
undertake investigation in respect to human rights violations. The Commission has full power 
to receive all complaints and carry out investigation on human rights violations unless the 
complaints of human rights violations are pending before the Parliament, the House of 
Federation, and Regional Council or before court of law at any level.157 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Parliament, and vice president of the Federal Supreme Court. The role of the Tribunal is to investigate the 
existence of grounds for removal of an appointee and submits recommendation to the Parliament. 
154   Proclamation No.210/2000, supra note 148,Article 35  
155 Haile Selessie and Edmund Volker, Contextualizing the Establishment of the Institution of Human Rights 
Protection in Ethiopia, in Kamal Hossain et al.(eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: 
National Experiences throughout the World, (2000) P.26. 
156 Proclamation No.210/2000, supra note 152, Article 19(2)(b) cum Article 36  
157 Ibid, Article 7  
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 4.2.2 The Institution of Ombudsman 
 
The institution of Ombudsman came to exist in Ethiopia as the same time with the Human 
Rights Commission. Both the Commission and the institution of Ombudsman have similar 
mode of establishment, but with different responsibilities. Like the Commission, the 
Ombudsman is parliamentary institution whose legal base is the Constitution. The institution 
is enshrined in the Constitution and created by the act of the Parliament. It is by virtue of 
article 55(15) of the 1995 Constitution that the Parliament established the institution of 
Ombudsman and determined its structure, powers and functions by Proclamation 
No.211/2000. According to the enabling Proclamation, the institution of Ombudsman is 
created independent in terms of institutional set up, finance, staffing and appointment or 
dismissal of  an appointee like that of the Human Rights Commissions.158 
 
In most countries, the role of the Ombudsman is inherently to protect the people against 
violations of rights, abuse of powers, unfair decisions and maladministration in order to 
improve public administration and make the government’s actions open to the public.159 
Similarly, the objective of the Ethiopian Ombudsman is to see to bringing about good 
governance, and ensuring the respect of the rights and benefits of citizens by executive 
organ.160 In order to achieve its objective, the institution of the Ombudsman is empowered to 
supervise the constitutionality and legality of administrative directives and decisions, conduct 
investigation in respect to maladministration, seek remedies if there is maladministration, and 
make recommendation for the revision of the existing laws, practices and policies.161 The 
Ombudsman is expressly prohibited to investigate decisions made in its legislative capacity 
by councils established by election, cases pending before court of law of any level, matters 
under investigation by Office of Auditor General, and decisions given by Security Forces in 
respect to matters of national security or defense.162 
 
                                                 
158 Proclamation No.211/2000, Institution of the Ombudsman Establishment Proclamation, Negarit Gazeta, 
(2000) Article 8-18. 
159 Peter Vedel kessing, Implementation of the Western Ombudsman Model in Countries in Democratic 
Transition, in Birgit Lindsnaes et al. (eds.), National Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working papers, 
 (the Danish Center for Human Rights, 2001), p.123. 
160 Proclamation No.211/2000, supra note 160, Article 5. 
161 Ibid, Article 6. 
162 Ibid, Article 7 
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In addition to its inherent power, the Parliament is empowered to ensure executive branch of 
government exercising its mandate as provided by the law. The functions of the executive 
branches of government and its interaction with citizens have been increasing from time to 
time, which in turn increase the possibility the rights of citizens being at stake. In order to 
safeguard individuals against maladministration, the Parliament has to monitor and follow up 
the exercise of executive and administrative powers. The establishment of an independent 
Ombudsman is one of the institutional mechanisms by which the Parliament can supervise the 
acts of any administrative body or agency to be in line with the constitutional rights of 
individuals and to prevent maladministration. As indicated under article 19(2) (f) of 
Proclamation No.211/2000, the Ombudsman should submit a report to the Parliament on 
matters of maladministration. Based on the report, the Parliament can call upon and question 
an official in charge of an administrative agency charged to have committed the 
maladministration.163 
 
4.2.3 The Relationship between the Two Institutions 
 
In regard to national human rights institutions, countries can have a single or a dual organ 
system. In a single organ system country, there is only  a human rights commission dealing 
with complaints concerning the infringement of human rights or an ombudsman  institute with 
a general competence to investigate claims from citizens.164 In dual organ system, there are 
both a human rights commission and an ombudsman institution with distinctive functions.165 
Despite the difference in the mandate of the institutions, in dual system there tends to be a 
possible overlap in the competence to review actions and omissions by the executive organ. 
 
As noted above, Ethiopia set up two separate institutions: the Human Rights Commission for 
human rights and an ombudsman institution for administrative issues. It is difficult to have a 
water-tight demarcation between powers of the two institutions. Believing that there is a 
possible overlap of power, the legislature has inserted common article 29 in both enabling 
proclamations. According to common article 29 of Proclamations No.210/2000 and 211/2000, 
in case of overlap of power, the question which institution would investigate should be 
                                                 
163 Proclamation No.1/1995, supra note 102,  Article 55(18) 
164 Leonard Besselink, Types of National Institutions  for the Protection of Human Rights and Ombudsman 
Institutions: an Overview of Legal and Institutional Issues, in Kamal Hossain et al.(eds.),supra note,  p.157  
165 Ibid 
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decided upon mutual consultation of the two institutions. If this does not work, the institution 
before which the matter first appears has the rights to carry out the investigation. 
 
4.3 Human Rights Challenges 
 
In the foregoing sections, we have tried to touch upon the attempts made beyond the trials for 
protection and promotion of human rights. Now let us move on to discuss the challenges 
human rights. In many jurisdictions, injecting a Bill of Human Rights into a constitution and 
the ratification of human rights instruments have become a widely shared experience. 
However, the full implementation of human rights is far from being realized. A simple 
entrenchment of human rights norms and a mere ratification of human rights instruments do 
not guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights in a country. As said, Ethiopia 
promulgated one of the most progressive constitutions in the world which provides a 
comprehensive foundation for rights, freedoms and equality.  
 
Despite the constitutional guarantees and the adoption of human rights instruments, the 
country has an appalling human rights record. Human rights norms enshrined in the 
Constitution are not evident in the implementation of domestic laws and government action. 
For instance, between 1991 and 2003, a total of 3,919 extra-judicial executions, 693 torture 
and non-fatal shootings cases, 1,158 illegal detentions, and 81,760 cases of miscarriage of 
justice were recorded in the country.166 Similarly, from December 2003 up to April 2004, 158 
extra-judicial killings, 106 cases of bodily injuries, 396 cases of torture, and over 220 cases of 
arbitrary detention were reported.167 In May 2005, the country conducted the third general 
elections under the current government and the 1995 Constitution for the national parliament 
(the House of People’s Representatives). Immediately after the poll, a dispute arose between 
the opposition parties and government as to the result of the elections. Sadly, the process 
precipitated the death of many innocent people, the detention of thousands of Ethiopians for 
long without charge and the fleeing of many to abroad. According to Amnesty International 
Report, the commission of inquiry established by the government to investigate the alleged 
use of force by security forces during 2005 demonstration found that 193 civilians were killed 
                                                 
166 The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, “Ethiopia: Human Rights Defenders under 
Pressure,” International Fact finding Mission’s Report, (2005) p.15. 
167 Ibid 
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and 765 people were injured.168 Moreover, the security officials held over 30,000 civilians 
incommunicado for up to three months in detention centres located in remote areas following 
the 2005 elections.169  
 
As we can see from the examples cited above, there are human rights violations in the country 
regardless of the entrenchment of human rights norms in the domestic legal system. It may be 
paradoxical to see such violations once again while it has been attempted to address all the 
past human rights wrongs through prosecution. What went wrong? Here it is very important 
to discuss some of challenges of human rights enforcement in the country. Below are some 
the main constraints to the enforcement of human rights in Ethiopia. 
 
4.3.1 The Weakness of the Judiciary 
 
The 1995 Constitution has recognized the establishment of independent judicial system which 
consists of federal and state courts.170 The Constitution under article 79(2) further declares 
that “the courts of any level shall be free from interference or influence of any government 
body, official of government or from any other source.” As to its structure, article 78 (2) & (3) 
of the Constitution stipulates that the federal government has Federal Supreme, High and First 
Instance Courts exercising jurisdiction over federal matters whereas each state has its own 
State Supreme, High and First Instance Courts assuming jurisdiction over the regional matters 
of the respective state. In federal matters arising within a territory of a state, the State 
Supreme Court and State High Court can exercise the jurisdictions of Federal High Court and 
of Federal First Instance Courts respectively through delegation.171  
 
Although courts have the power to exercise jurisdictions over all justiciable cases, they can 
not interpret the Constitution in case of constitutional dispute as the power to interpret the 
Constitution is explicitly given to the House of Federation (the upper house the Parliament) 
which is a political organ.172 In its task of constitutional interpretation, the House of 
Federation is assisted by an expert body called the Council Constitutional Inquiry which will 
examine the dispute and submit its findings to the House of Federation for final deliberation 
                                                 
168 Amnesty international Report, supra note 81. 
169 US State Department Report, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Ethiopia, 6 March, 2007. 
170 Proclamation No.1/1995, supra note 102, Article 78. 
171 Ibid, Article 80 (2) & (4). 
172 Ibid, Article 37(1), 62(1), and 79 (1). 
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or remand the case to the competent court if the council finds no ground for constitutional 
interpretation.173 As per 84 (2) and (3) of the Constitution, where the constitutionality of a law 
is contested or the issue of constitutional interpretation arises before a court, the court or a 
party to the dispute has to bring it to the attention of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. 
Every time when a case before court appears to beg constitutional dispute, the court has to 
refer it to Council, and the latter to the House of Federation. This is one of the legislative 
limitations on the judicial power of courts. 
 
Upon the take over of power, the current government dismissed many well trained and 
experienced judges who were suspected of having taken part in the repressive practices under 
the defunct regime.174 The purges of judges led to a shortage of experienced and well trained 
judges in the country which, in turn, has hampered the independence of the judiciary. As one 
study pointed out many of the newly appointed judges lack the necessary experience and 
professional confidence in order to act independently.175 And many judges suffer from “self-
imposed restraints” in cases which touch upon the interest of the government.176 In effect, in 
high profile cases the Ethiopian courts show little independence or concern for defendants’ 
procedural rights. Serious constraints of resources further add up to the problem. As result of 
shortage of competent personnel and meager resources, courts are weak and overburdened. 
For instance, in 1998 there were 71,000 pending cases in Addis Ababa alone before a total of 
53 judges and 140,000 pending cases in Amhara Regional state.177  As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the lengthy pre-trial detention and the seemingly endless cycle of judicial 
adjournments are common in the judicial system. This allows the government to neutralize its 
political opponents by putting them on trial on charges of political violence that courts take 
years to adjudicate.  
 
In some cases, political and executive officials have shown a propensity to take the law in 
their own hands. In one case, despite five consecutive release orders from the second bench of 
Federal First Instance Court (issued in April and May 1997), the police officer refused to 
release two hermits held in custody for their suspected participation in a plot to assassinate the 
                                                 
173 Ibid, Article 82 and 84. 
174 Julie Mayfield, supra note 5, p.589. 
175  Frode Elgesem, the Derg Trials in the Context: a Study of Some Aspects of the Ethiopian Judiciary, (1998) 
p.17. 
176 Ibid, p16. 
177 Ibid, p.21. 
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Patriarch of the Orthodox Church.178 In other incident, the Police Department of Shakcho 
Zone in Southern People’s Region requested the High Court to issue an arrest warrant to 
apprehend seven zone officials suspected for the killings of three individuals.179 Since the 
presiding judge granted the arrest warrant to the police for arrest of the suspects, he was 
suspended by a letter written by one of the suspects.180 This is a clear case of violation of the 
judicial independence. Article 79(4) of the Constitution states that "No judge shall be 
removed from his duties unless the Judicial Administration Commission decides to remove 
him for violations of disciplinary rules or….” 
 
Any person whose rights are violated should have a judicial remedy. As discussed above, 
courts are duty bound to enforce fundamental freedoms and rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution. Unfortunately, the full realization of the constitutionally guaranteed rights have 
become uncertain because of a sever shortage of trained staff, the lack of confidence to 
function independently, the intervention, and the traditional perception by the public that the 
court is an extension of state power rather than a law enforcement body.181 
 
4.3.2 Constraints on the Work of Human Rights Defenders 
 
In Ethiopia, civil societies which involve in monitoring, protecting and promoting human 
rights are regarded as political opposition or maneuvering especially when they criticize or 
expose the misdeeds or incompetence of the government.182  Ethiopian human rights 
defenders have faced numerous constraints in carrying out their activities, and remain at risk 
of repression. One of the serious constraints on the work of human rights defenders is a 
bureaucratic registration process and problems of obtaining license. According to the 
Ethiopian Civil Code and the Association Registration Regulation, associations should be 
registered by Ministry of Justice for their establishment. Besides, to carry out their activities, 
they should get renewed their license periodically by Ministry of Justice. As per the 
International Fact-Finding Mission Report on Ethiopia, many human rights organizations 
have suffered from the discretionary power of the Ministry which grants registration or 
                                                 
178 Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Illegal Detention, Special Report No.15, Addis Ababa, (27 May, 1997). 
179 Ethiopian Human Rights Council, supra note 107. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid p.28-29. 
182 Sisay Gebre-Egziabher, The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Democratization Process in Ethiopia, a 
paper presented in the fifth international conference of the international society for the Third-Sector Research , 
South Africa, University of Cape Town , (2002) p.12. 
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renews license in a selective manner (human rights groups have more difficulties in getting 
registrations than humanitarian organizations).183  The lack of clarity as to the criteria 
according to which an application for registration can be granted or rejected renders the whole 
registration process discretionary and thus undermines the work of human rights defenders.184  
 
Sometimes the government interferes directly or indirectly in the activities of human rights 
organizations. In this regard, the government authorities attempted to liquidate the “genuine” 
organizations and tried to replace by government affiliated ones.185 The Ethiopian Free 
Journalist Associations, created in1993 to protect the independence of journalist and promotes 
freedom of expression, was officially suspended and its accounts were frozen, under the 
pretext of the association had not submitted its financial report to the Ministry of Justice.186  
In the meanwhile, the government tried to establish a new government affiliated association 
albeit unsuccessful.187 In 2001, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), a 
professional organization, publicly criticized the Ministry of Justice for its failure to 
effectively arrest, investigate and prosecute the known perpetrator in an ongoing case of 
domestic violence.188 Following the criticism, the Ministry officially announced that EWLA 
was suspended for allegedly “engaging in activities different from those it was mandated by 
law,” without substantiating its allegations.189 
 
4.3.3 Lack of Commitment to Human Rights  
 
The other human rights challenge is lack of the government’s commitment to human rights 
enforcement in the country. One may wonder why states join human rights treaties without 
being committed to their enforcement. In one study, it is indicated that new regimes nowadays 
join human rights treaties in order to gain reputation from a commitment to human rights, to 
distance themselves from abuses by prior regimes and thereby to obtain collateral benefits 
such as investment, trade, aid, and political support.190 In particular, countries like Ethiopia 
                                                 
183 The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, supra note 166, p.19. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid, pp 23-25. 
186 Ibid, pp.24-25. 
187 Ibid, p.25. 
188 Ibid, p.24. 
189 Ibid, p.24. 
190 Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
(2007), p.597. 
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may ratify various human rights treaties or inject them in the domestic system for the said 
considerations, instead of being committed to their full realization. 
 
The problem is compounded by lack of public awareness about the issue of human rights.  
Since many people in Ethiopia do not know about human rights, they do not claim for the 
realization of their rights and can not put a pressure on the government to comply with human 
rights norms. In this regard, the human rights defenders, the government and the Human 
Rights Commission should work a lot to increase public awareness and enable the people to 
claim their rights. 
 
4.3.4 Absence of Human rights Monitoring Institutions 
 
The human rights monitoring institutions can play a major role in the enforcement of human 
rights in a country. There were no such institutions in Ethiopia until recently. As discussed, 
although the 1995 Constitution provides for the establishment of Human Rights Commission 
and Ombudsman, these institutions were not set up until 2000. After their establishment they 
had to wait for five years to commence operations. The mere existence of these institutions 
does not guarantee the enforcement human rights. They should carry out their activities 
independently and efficiently.  
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        Chapter Five 
5 Conclusion 
 
Soon after the demise of the Derg regime, the current government of Ethiopia decided to 
address the past state-sponsored human rights violations through judicial means. In 
accordance with this decision, the Office of Special Prosecutor charged over 5000 members 
of the defunct regime for the past human rights violations. At the beginning, the decision to 
prosecute the perpetrators received a great appreciation from inside and outside thinking that 
the process would heal the wounds of the society, prevent the recurrence of such kind 
atrocities in the future, and bring the culture of impunity to an end. However, through the 
passage of time, it becomes clear that the entire process has failed to ensure accountability for 
the past human rights violations while respecting the rights of the defendants in conformity 
with the international human rights standards and domestic law. As discussed there have been 
lengthy pre-trial detentions, violations of the rights of speedy trial and of the rights to counsel. 
Besides, the process has received low public attention. This, in turn, limits significance of the 
process in providing a lesson to the public. The recurrence of human rights violations has also 
made the prosecution doubtful whether it would achieve the desired result. 
 
In addition to addressing the legacy of the past, the country has taken various measures to 
create a human rights culture. The measures taken include ratification of human rights 
instruments, incorporation human rights norms in the domestic legal system, revising national 
laws in line with Bill of Rights, and establishment of human rights monitoring institutions. 
Notwithstanding these measures, the enforcement of human rights is far from being realized. 
In fact, different human rights reports show that there have still been human rights violations 
in the country while addressing the past and incorporating human rights norms. There are so 
many challenges to the enforcements of human rights, including the weakness of the 
judiciary, lack of public awareness, lack of commitment to human rights on the part of the 
government, the legacy of state repression, serious constraints to the work of human rights 
defenders. These challenges have to be solved in order to guarantee the enforcement of human 
rights. 
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